Europe’s relationship with China has become a challenge for the EU’s political and economic model, forcing it to confront a paradox: to curb strategic dependence without closing the open market. EU leaders believe it is possible to change the nature of their relationship without betraying their ideals about rules-based trade, while introducing more political and legal discipline into economic strategy (1). The main issue here is no longer whether it is possible but whether EU leaders are ready to proceed.
How Can We Reframe De-Risking
When the EU refers to de-risking, it is often interpreted as implying the elimination of an untrustworthy partner. However, Garcia-Herrero and Vasselier (2024) believe there is a more balanced view of de-risking, one that supports sustainable coexistence with a major competitor like China. It essentially views interdependence as something that can be formed, and Europe will remain reliant on China in many industries, such as green tech, manufacturing, and climate diplomacy, while trying to address the main political bottlenecks (1). The EU's new strategy aims to avoid labelling de-risking as a "China-only" project and uses a country-neutral vocabulary to create a legal framework. The EU does not want to introduce any restrictions; doing so would put it in a sensitive position. All activities need to be backed up by facts, and in harmony with WTO rules, although it is widely understood that China is the primary target. (2).
Fine Line Between Strategy and Protectionism
As for national security, every tool the EU uses, including export controls, investment screening, and regulations on 5G and essential infrastructure, walks a fine line between genuine protection and protectionism (3). Beijing's warning that EU measures could "hurt big enterprises,” and here “investment confidence” is nothing but diplomatic posturing, serves as a reminder that the world decides what's fair, not the EU. If Brussels uses the cover of national security as a tactic to pursue traditional industrial policies or to shield uncompetitive sectors, its claim to be an open and free order will be critically eroded (2). To remain a reliable partner, the EU needs to do the more difficult thing: it will need to clearly document any risks and emergency measures, and hold itself to the same international disciplines it tells others to follow.
When navigating the economics of being heavily dependent on China while rejecting economic nationalism, Garcia-Herrero and Vasselier (2024) believe the way forward is to "de-risk" relations with China by introducing partnerships across raw materials, digital standards, and clean-tech supply chains. Along similar lines, it is worth noting the new EU initiatives, such as purchasing platforms and coordinated screening frameworks, which work best when it collaborates closely with its G7 and Global South allies rather than adopting a siege mentality (1). This is where the EU’s self-identity as a regulatory power can be seen as a strength rather than a weakness. The EU can use its economic security plans to develop alternative supply routes by investing in African or Latin American value chains, making de-risking a public good rather than a zero-sum game against China (3).
The Uncomfortable Paradox the EU Must Adopt
The EU has consistently attempted to make its relationship with China more secure. But in doing so, it has been sending mixed messages to third countries, and it takes time and effort to convince these partners that the EU has a solid plan (2). Well-known for being caught between rival and partner status with China, the EU has to understand that China can use the very interdependence the EU relies on as a weapon (1). In the near future, the EU will not be able to eliminate this interdependence; it will just manage it by ensuring it complies with all guidelines.